SADF conventional warfare capacity exhibited a decline during the 1950s, followed by belated efforts at rearmament and consolidation during the 1960s. However, Operation Savannah, the SADF's intervention in the Angolan civil war during [1975][1976], as the force's first involvement in a conventional-type war since 1945, exposed SADF weaknesses, but also strengths. Authorised amidst debilitating secrecy by a miscalculating South African government, Savannah demonstrated significant South African military equipment inadequacies, particularly in terms of artillery, armour and the need for an infantry combat vehicle. Savannah also gave hints of SADF strength residing in the resourcefulness of its personnel and their aptitude for mobile warfare. But rapid and effective Cuban military intervention also showed that SADF conventional warfare reaction and capacity needed urgent attention. This article attempts to address some of these themes while following the course of this "first battle" by the SADF after thirty years of relative peace.
Introduction
This article's purpose is two-fold: firstly, it concerns how, during , the Union Defence Force (UDF)/South African Defence Force (SADF) 1 maintained its capacity successfully to defend the country against a conventional war threat. Secondly and more pertinently, it examines Operation Savannah, South Africa's military intervention in the Angolan civil war during late 1975 to early 1976. Unlike the UDF's operations during World War Two, Savannah was a cross-border intervention to obtain political, military and foreign policy objectives in a very different context. Savannah did not involve an expeditionary force fighting afar alongside powerful allies, nor a conventional military defence of South Africa's borders. Rather it was a kind of pre-emptive military strike, shrouded in secrecy, with an intention to ensure a political objective of assisting the establishment of a post-colonial Angolan regime favourably-disposed to the South African government, and one which would also hopefully, deny future assistance to the combatants of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO).
In 1975, the global Cold War political context was dominated by the two superpowers, engaged also in their own détente process. Both still sought strategic advantages, where plausible, upon all continents including Africa. The Americans were cautious. Their military withdrawal in Vietnam had caused them a loss of international prestige and they shrank from further foreign military interventions. Soviet internal economic problems remained subordinated to ideological idealism that taught Third World anti-colonial struggles were an important site for advancing socialism. Soviet leadership perceived no conflict in principle between their improving relations with the USA while assisting developing countries, although Angola was not at the time part of Soviet planning. Reluctantly at first, then with growing conviction, 2 the Soviet Union supported Cuba's independent mission to militarily aid the communist-aligned black African nationalist movement: Movimento Popular de Libertaҫӑo de Angola (MPLA). 3 The United States responded, in the case of Angola, with hesitant undercover Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intervention, this being one but not the only contributory factor to South African military intervention.
Since the end of World War Two, South Africa's status in international relations had altered markedly, from it being a respected Commonwealth member to one of near pariah status in consequence to condemnation of apartheid from virtually all other countries, but particularly the Afro-Asian and socialist blocs. The USA could never allow itself to be seen in open military alliance with South Africa.
On 25 April 1974, a socialist coup in Portugal was precipitated through Metrópole citizens' political grievances, which included supporting independence for Portugal's African colonies and immediate disengagement from the attendant expensive and unpopular wars. Hasty negotiations with the three anti-colonial guerrilla movements led to the Alvor Agreement of 15 January 1975, whereby 11 November 1975 was agreed as both the Angolan independence date and for the withdrawal of all Portuguese troops.
The MPLA's opposition were the Frento de Libertaҫӑo de Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto, drawing most specifically off the Bakonga people of northern Angola. The Uniӑo Nacional para a Independência Total d Angola (UNITA), with an Ovimbundu tribal base, whose leader was Jonas Savimbi, constituted the third grouping. 4 By mid-1975, Angola was wracked with civil war. The original ceasefire was ignored, while across the entire country, the three anti-colonial organisations engaged one another in armed strife. With remaining Portuguese security forces confined to barracks by order of their own government, most of the white Portuguese Angolan population, witnessing if not directly experiencing the spreading anarchy, made haste in preparing to flee. 5 By August 1975, the MPLA occupied and controlled most of the towns in central and southern Angola. SADF troops first entered Angola on 10 August 1975, ostensibly to protect the Ruacana hydro-electric installations at Calueque. Notwithstanding the importance of this infrastructure to SWA/Namibia's electricity and water, it seems plausible the South African government calculatingly used threats thereto as a casus belli to place their first troops.
Therefore, acting as indirect proxies for the United States and Soviet Union, South Africa and Cuba later started committing further military forces, while backing different Angolan liberation movements. Fidel Castro's decision to support the MPLA was based upon "internationism" besides no doubt raising Cuba's revolutionary status amongst the Third World. Like the SADF personnel assisting Unita and the FNLA, Cuban troops were firstly advisers/trainers/regulars, but were soon reinforced by significant numbers of conscripts and became involved in combat alongside their respective Angolan allies. The South African government's first priority was to stiffen the anti-MPLA forces militarily, but by late November, South African troops were pressing against MPLA/Cuban forces from Novo Redondo on the coast to the "central front," where the SADF, purportedly en route to Luanda, were attempting an advance towards Quibala. From around mid-December 1975, increasing Cuban troop numbers arrived, accompanied by significant amounts of Soviet weaponry. Further, SADF campaigning northward now required committing greater resources, with every prospect of high white SADF conscript casualties, compared to the comparatively paltry few already sustained. With SADF logistical capability strained and the South African government facing international criticism and embarrassment, after earlier denials of military involvement, all SADF personnel were withdrawn by mid-March 1976.
Savannah was prompted by South African government motives: strengthen the FNLA and Unita leaders' positions for a future political dispensation, alongside Pretoria's hope that such a "moderate" Angolan government would curb future Swapo incursions into SWA/Namibia. Prime Minister John Vorster was also pursuing his own détente foreign policy with certain black African states, and he had received clandestine appeals from some to counter growing communist influence in Angola. With the beleaguered Afrikaner nationalist government flattered by similar overtures from the CIA, direct military intervention was too tempting to resist. South Africa could facilitate an anti-colonial process making it "part of Africa", instead of being tainted as an ally of former European colonial powers. 6 The But Operation Savannah was a grave diplomatic miscalculation. South Africa would be deserted by both their fickle African allies and the CIA, while the FNLA's chances as a serious political contender were destroyed. Unita retreated to the bush to fight on for another two and a half decades. SADF senior commanders later placed personal responsibility on Van den Bergh for "misleading them" over the likely extent of American support, while Van den Bergh insisted responsibility lay with P.W. Botha.
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The South African government's secrecy constrictions were limitations with which the Cubans did not encumber themselves.
SADF military intervention occurred incrementally as the situation changed, while the government's determination to prevent escalation restricted their field commanders from calling assistance from what the best SADF weaponry could offer, for example, the usage of South African Air Force (SAAF) ground attack aircraft. There was an insistence on an absolute minimum of white SADF casualties, fearing such might alienate electoral support or ferment negativity towards national service. But with conscripts involved, concealing Savannah from the white South African public was impossible, despite the initial relatively small white troop numbers using "non-South African" uniforms and equipment, a factor which further complicated logistical support.
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South African political foreign policy and military objectives were confusingly enmeshed and SADF leadership were subordinated to the government's equivocations. An exclusive committee of senior staff officers initially controlled operations according to the dictates of Vorster and Botha.
13
Jannie Geldenhuys, then Army Director of Operations, commented unfavourably on this, believing the whole SADF should have been involved with the media properly informed.
14 Control and command problems occurred that were directly related to the extent of secrecy. The army struggled during this period with inadequate facilities, poor junior instructor quality and low permanent force recruiting numbers. 43 Uncertainties existed as to how much conventional warfare preparedness had to be stressed compared to counter-insurgency training. Leopold Scholtz believes that, despite some significant small arms upgrades, the 1960s infantry battalions received a poor level of training.
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An exception being 1 Parachute Battalion, founded in 1961, with an original intention of providing the army with a rapid deployable unit against internal insurrection.
The army possessed over two hundred Saracen armoured personnel carriers, but integrated these only on a very limited basis into infantry and armour units, besides a few citizen force regiments. 45 while artillery requirements went beyond gun acquisitions, but also included associated equipment. 70 Target acquisition/locating equipment dated from the 1950s, of which mortar locating radar was the most useful. 71 The Green Archer system which originated from 1962 72 was not used in Savannah; instead, the artillery employed their more modern Cymbeline radar, 73 although its reliability proved questionable in the heat and wet.
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Anti-aircraft artillery acquisitions during the 1960s included 35-mm Oelikon guns, but during Savannah, only 20-mm anti-aircraft guns were deployed and with very limited success against MPLA/Cuban aerial reconnaissance.
Conventional Warfare Organisation: 1960s
SADF conventional warfare planning altered several times during the seven year period of Commandant General (CG) Rudolf Hiemstra being either the SADF Chief (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) , or previous CG Piet Grobbelaar's deputy (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) . 75 For most of the 1960s, SADF strategy reflected a "combat group" concept, grounded upon organisation against possible black insurrection. From 1962, training bases were widely spread and included "full time force components". 76 Hiemstra also initiated abolition of the Defence Secretariat, reasoning that it complicated communications between the SADF's top structure and the responsible minister. Hiemstra's concept of a "joint combat forces" (JCF) commander and "joint maritime forces" commander, instituted late in 1965, was abandoned shortly after he had retired by 1972. These were structures by which any threat could supposedly be countered, with the two "chiefs" selecting their required forces, while also comprising the SADF's "supreme command," along with the CG and three services heads. 77 In February 1970, the magazine Personality 78 introduced Hiemstra and the SADFs most senior generals and admirals in an article clearly intended to reassure white South Africans on defence issues. Readers (or national servicemen parents) were told that military service was of national importance and their "boys" well looked after, with taxes responsibly spent upon increasing but necessary defence budgets. Hiemstra emphasised the need "to maintain a well-trained, well-equipped and balanced force, capable of fulfilling whatever demands may be made on it …" Ironically, such change only started moving slowly forward from 1974. In 1970, when Army Chief Lt. Gen. Willem Louw laid out his plan for enlarging the army, 79 JCF Commander General Alan ("Pops") Fraser had already in June 1968 remarked, that the envisaged division "was a 'paper tiger' on account of the deficiency of vehicles, weapons, ammunition and a headquarters". This was a candid acknowledgement that the 1960s had not been markedly successful for planning an effective conventional force.
Unfortunately, Hiemstra throughout his career had prioritised continued politicisation of the SADF, above studying and managing its appropriate reorganisation and modernisation. 80 Malan wrote that very early during his appointment as Army Chief in 1974, he established that no priority list existed for the acquisition of armaments, or any clearly formulated requirements with regard to existing armaments. Consequently, armaments had been purchased haphazardly; indeed a critical reflection upon his predecessors. 81 During the 1960s, the increased value of special forces was being emphasised; yet, in 1968, Hiemstra saw no value in creating such an SADF unit. Lt. Gen. Louw and intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Fritz Loots, supported by P.W. Botha, gave their assent to the creation of such a unit, supposedly without Hiemstra's knowledge.
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Hiemstra was due to retire in 1973, but left a year earlier, when offered by Botha (quoting Hiemstra), "another position where for a few years I can still perform useful work for our country" 83 And while not suggesting they formed a bloc deliberately opposing modernisation, it is comprehensible that after MEDO's collapse, SADF top commanders could not with conscious urgency anticipate South Africa facing any looming conventional threat.
Compared to World War Two, counter-insurgency threats must have appeared small beer; the notion of training towards a mobile warfare doctrine still had to permeate. 87 The counter-insurgency warfare "school,"
still in the ascendant during the immediate pre-Savannah years, was unconvinced by Israeli victories in three quick conventional wars, being attributable to well-commanded, highly manoeuvrable and well-supported ground and airborne army formations. 88 After a training course held in 1968, which dealt with counter-insurgency threats against South Africa, including the danger of such transforming into a conventional assault, a decision was apparently made that the army would not be bound by static defence, but would start developing towards mobile warfare. 89 However, during the same year, Fraser introduced his landmark work Lessons learnt from past revolutionary wars, 90 resulting in the emphasis remaining on counter-insurgency warfare 91 -a miscalculation, for it implied the SADF would not need to train for a future conventional war.
Conventional Warfare Structure: 1974-1975
By 1974, the army's structure had started to become more settled and its two roles clearly defined: an effective conventional force but also capable of training and maintaining a counter-insurgency capacity. By then, 7 th Infantry
Division and an 8 th Armoured Division had been established, each with three brigades, together constituting 1 SA Corps. This reorganisation was also intended to avoid "doctrinal pollution," whereby reservists particularly, because of their limited training time, were unable to adequately assimilate two markedly different concepts of war. 92 The intention was for the brigades to begin training at the start of 1975. 93 From late 1975, newly appointed SADF Chief Admiral Hugo Biermann, established a new top management structure consisting of himself, the three new services heads and directors of intelligence and operations. 94 The SADF had taken over patrolling the SWA/Namibian border from the SA Police, whose resources were inadequate, notwithstanding serious inter-service conflicts, including resentments that the police had long usurped the SADF's role. 95 The SADF were now principally concerned with counter-insurgency operations against Swapo and anti-guerrilla warfare; therefore, receiving priority emphasis during conscript training.
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Operation Savannah
Savannah was not the first time South African armed forces had deployed deep into Africa, and by 1975, the SADF had technologically overcome at least some of the logistical challenges envisaged by Maj. Gen. Jack Collyer, when he wrote his histories intended for prompting staff officer thinking, when planning for war in Africa. 97 Only a small part of the SADF's capacity was mobilised for Savannah, an operation which did not resemble the standard defensive conventional war scenarios the SADF was orientated towards -particularly if we define land conventional war as a situation where heavy weapons (specifically armour and artillery) are involved, with supporting troop numbers at divisional and brigade strength, against similar counterparts, with combat air support on both sides. Forces during Savannah were smaller formations with some artillery and light armour support and often deployed as motorised columns. Air operations involved extensive logistical support, along with light aircraft and helicopter reconnaissance missions. The only combat air operations were one or two inconsequential attacks upon SADF forces and one ineffective SAAF bombing attempt.
The original SADF aim was to support Unita and the FNLA with arms and training, using comparatively few white soldiers or heavy arms. Task Force Zulu's initial advances were entirely dependent upon SADF leadership and armoured cars. Recognisable conventional war situations occurred during Zulu's final thrusts through Novo Redondo, the Ebo battle, the artillery duels, the SADF advance around/over Bridge 14, Battle Group Orange's operations and Battle Group X-Ray's advances during December 1975, attempting to gain control of the Benguela railway line.
Initial Direct Intervention: SADF/UNITA
An SAN submarine was on occasion present off Angola from August 1975, 100 while two frigates alternated in patrolling the coastline. 101 The
South African government first involved army units from 9 August to protect the Ruacana and Calueque dam/hydro-electric infrastructure and by 20 October, these 2 SAI troops, with armour support, 102 Spies, Heitman states the intervention was limited to involve a maximum of 2 500 men and 600 vehicles. 114 The basic objective was that by the 11 November, Independence Day, SADF assistance would have rendered Unita and the FNLA strong enough to retain what territory they held, possibly even preventing an MPLA political victory. The MPLA were to be ejected from southern Angola and control established over the Benguela railway line. Foxbat was intended to block any western MPLA advance 115 123 Although by this stage, Cuban special forces had arrived 124 and had stiffened the demoralised MPLA.
Under Comdt. Delville Linford, Alpha led Zulu towards Novo Redondo, where at the Quicombo River, 19 km short of the town, an Eland troop was ambushed, and Linford withdrew after taking significant casualties amongst a conscript-crewed mortar group. 125 However, the same MPLA/Cubans were later beaten back, with support from a recently arrived 88-mm artillery troop. After further fighting, Novo Redondo fell in SADF hands by 13 November. Zulu's intention was now to advance to Quibala via Porto Amboim and Gabela. Cuban expertise ensured the bridge over the Queve River was destroyed, besides all others on the designated route. An attempted probe of the defences by Breytenbach's Bravo group was forced to retreat after coming under intense rocket and mortar fire. Although later, the 88-mm guns again assisted destroying three MPLA/Cuban rocket positions. 126 After that, hostilities on this front became limited to artillery duels, 127 besides an attempt on 24 November to investigate damage at the bridge on the Gabela route, leading to casualties when an Eland was immobilised by MPLA mortar fire. 128 By 18 November, Task Force Zulu had travelled 3 159 kilometres, during which an impressive tally of engagements occurred, with severe casualties inflicted upon the MPLA/Cuban forces for minimal SADF losses. 129 Until halted by rivers which could not be forded without combat engineering equipment, Zulu's successes could be attributed to the SADF leadership group and their heavy weapons capability, particularly the Elands manned by well-trained conscripts. 130 Zulu was also sufficiently supplied by air transportation and overall better organised and equipped than their MPLA opponents.
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Cuban Reinforcements/FNLA Defeat in Northern Angola
By 7 November, Castro had decided to reinforce the original Cuban instructors via Operation Carlota, starting with an air-lifted 652-man special forces battalion, followed by an artillery regiment. Political power was formally handed over by the Portuguese governor on 11 November, leaving the MPLA as the government in Luanda, recognised by a number of socialist and African states, but nothing similar was forthcoming for the makeshift FNLA/Unita government at Huambo (Novo Lisboa). Yet, with their forces in the south defeated, the MPLA faced a serious problem; further SADF/Unita/FNLA advance could threaten water, power and food to Luanda.
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But now events in northern Angola were to have a profound impact upon Savannah. On 10 November, Holden Roberto's FNLA troops, supported by 120 Portuguese Angolans, two Zairian battalions, a handful of Panhard armoured cars and two North Korean-built 130-mm cannons, in preparation for an attack upon the capital, launched a suicidal assault upon Quifangondo, 50 km east of Luanda. Generals Malan and Viljoen had visited Ambriz on 4 November and found Roberto, against all advice, persisting with this plan. Two days earlier, Cuban special force members had arrived and immediately went to assist MPLA defences, joining other Cubans manning 6 BDM-21 rocket launchers. 133 Botha and the SADF generals continued assisting Roberto and even acceded to his request for artillery (three 140-mm guns and crews), besides support via three SAAF Canberra light bombers. The FNLA attack was a predictable disaster, observed by the SADF advisory team under Brigadier Ben Roos together with CIA officers. The BDMs outranged the SADF artillery, and the aerial bombing (for fear of SAAF casualties) occurred from too high, being therefore completely ineffective. Further useful CIA assistance ended and all remaining SADF personnel were evacuated by the SAN from Ambriz on 27 November, while by mid-February 1976, the remaining northern FNLA troops were completely routed.
Battles of Ebo and Bridge 14: The "Stalled" Central Front
On 12 November, Savannah's command structure was formalised: 101 Task Force was established under Maj. Gen. Andre Van Deventer with its headquarters at Rundu, although the South African government had already decided upon a gradual withdrawal from Angola. After leaving Alpha at Novo Redondo, Zulu swung east and when arriving at Cela, Breytenbach noted the war now looked more a reflection of typical SADF white racial demographics. 134 But while Cuban reinforcements continued arriving, the SADF was operating at increasingly longer logistical lines, and Van Deventer was concerned that the SADF's logistics would struggle to sustain any war escalation. 135 Meanwhile "a few hundred" Cubans commanded by Diaz Arguelles and about 400 MPLA troops, shadowed the SADF east across the 160-km front, assessing which routes they were likely to take in advancing upon Quibala. 136 The SADF had recaptured virtually all the territory in the south lost by Unita and the FNLA during previous months, but a possible MPLA defeat had already been averted by the FNLA defeat outside Luanda. During one SADF pursuit of MPLA forces, the main bridge (later Bridge 14) was blown, destroying the most obvious Quibala approach. Several other clashes occurred with Cuban/MPLA forces in the Ebo/Hengo area, particularly on 18 November near a junction called the "Y", where Foxbat's troops got the upper hand. 137 By 22 November, a tactical headquarters under Brig. Dawie Schoeman was established in Cela, controlling all combat groups in 2 Military Area. Responding to orders based upon political imperatives, Schoeman instructed Comdt. George Kruys, the newly appointed Foxbat commander, to advance in haste towards Quibala. The approach route was a well-watered agricultural district, where numerous winding roads joined farms, although these were often impassable during the rainy season.
The South Africans had been reinforced by three more companies of Unita and FNLA infantry, but the actual probe through Ebo was undertaken by a team consisted of four 88-mm guns, two FNLA and two Unita companies, an Eland squadron, two Jeep-mounted 106-mm recoilless guns and two 4.2-inch mortars, with observation support from a light aircraft. Kruys feared any surprise had been squandered earlier on 22 November, after an unknown aircraft overflew SADF positions and no attempt was made to destroy it. Advancing in swampy territory, the vehicles were compelled to keep to the road. The force's commander, Capt. Johan Holm, led the column into an area well reconnoitred for ambush. A group of 70 Cuban special force troops were concealed on the northern bank of the Mabassa River bridge, 138 armed with RPG launchers and recoilless guns and supported from their rear by BDM-21s and mortars. During the ensuing engagement, several Elands were either destroyed or bogged down 139 while, because of aircraft sighting problems, the SADF artillery battled to locate targets effectively. 140 Kruys later lamented that ill-trained Unita infantry had to be used to support the advance, resulting in their headlong flight from the Cuban/MPLA bombardment. He also cited the orders to force through Ebo as markedly unsound, 141 particularly because information received prior, indicated the route was rugged, with many potential delaying positions. The Cuban's success was celebrated by them as the most decisive military moment in the war. Arguelles, who was killed a few days later, was memorialised by the Angolans. 142 The battle damaged the "invincible image" of the South Africans and their Eland 90 armoured cars and SADF reinforcements were urgently requested to hold the line and counter the skilled Cuban artillery. 143 A lull for several days allowed the Cubans space to further build up their forces from resources now landing at Luanda. 144 SADF white troop losses at Ebo included 5 killed and 11 wounded, while an estimated 50-80 Unita and FNLA infantry perished with approximately the same number wounded. 145 Trained SADF infantry were sought to overcome natural ambushes/obstacles, while additional SADF artillery was about to be deployed and SADF infantry were now considered necessary for gun protection and observation posts. One company of 2 SAI infantry arrived at the central front intended also to be used in an offensive role, if required. 146 147 On 1 December, Admiral Biermann gave the South African press an "off the record" account, acknowledging the virtual collapse of the FNLA as a fighting force and that SADF troops were now 700 km into Angola, where most of their casualties had occurred. He stated further that the MPLA had the largest and best force amongst the liberation movements and was likely to win any long-term civil war. No mention was made of Cuban forces, although for several months, newspapers had skirted the restrictions of the Defence Act, reporting on the civil war and alluding to the presence of white troops on both sides. 148 Only from January 1976, did Paratus start producing some sanitised articles on Savannah, commencing with a report about troops guarding the Ruacana and Calueque water installations. 149 During the "Bridge 14" victory in mid-December, outstanding SADF artillery deployment proved decisive, particularly the 140-mm guns which cost Cuban/MPLA forces heavily in both men and equipment. After SADF engineers had repaired the bridge with logs, advancing was militarily the most obvious thing to do, but the makeshift crossing could not support the guns, while rain and mud hampered the Elands return. But Cuban/MPLA casualties were severe, with losses of a magnitude which the SADF never suffered during Savannah. 150 Yet, despite their hard defeat, the Cuban/MPLA forces were not completely destroyed, for they regrouped and continued to block the Quibala/Luanda route. 151 Malan visited the front on 15 December and reiterated that the SADF would withdraw in January and no further reinforcements were to be dispatched, but aggressive use was to continue with existing resources. 152 The battle line was now effectively static, extending across scattered positions from the west (Novo Redondo) to the east where Battle-group Orange was deployed and in regular action.
On 18 December, the SADF forces near Quibala suffered a severe propaganda defeat, when four white troops were captured while recovering damaged vehicles, providing conclusive proof that South Africans were fighting in Angola. By 20 December, much of Foxbat's personnel were relieved by fresh troops: Brig. J.D. Potgieter replaced Schoeman and Comdt. Pat Venter took over from Kruys. 153 The 2 SAI troops were replaced by two companies from 5 SAI and 8 SAI respectively, along with two troops of armoured cars from reserve Battle-group Beaver; making up now over 3 000 SADF troops in Angola, above the original ceiling laid down by the government.
Battle-group Orange, formed originally as a reserve in late November, had been shifted to the central front to locate potential river crossings east of Bridge 14, starting with the Salazar Bridge, hopefully thereafter, forcing a route through to Quibala. Unfortunately, this crossing had been destroyed while the Pombuigi River to the west was equally impassable. 154 The SADF's inability to forge this river was a serious setback for the general planning. By 20 December, Battle-group Orange's position came under increasing Cuban/MPLA bombardment, while enemy patrols had infiltrated behind the South African artillery, placing the gunners under particular strain. The Cubans had excellent observation of Orange's positions and on 23 December, an artillery duel resulted in two SADF gunners killed. On Christmas Day, South African patrols sent to Orange's rear were strafed by an enemy jet fighter, while the 140-mm range limitations ensured they could not silence the BDM-21s. 155 Despite the South Africans still inflicting casualties on their opponents, Orange encountered increasingly strong resistance which at times threatened to envelope them, and by early January 1976, this front looked the most precarious of all the SADF positions. Similarly Battle-group X-Ray, after capturing Luso on the Benguela railway line, could not force their control over the rest of this infrastructure running east to Zaire.
Citizen Force mobilisation
Vorster and P.W. Botha were the prime movers behind the decision in either late December or early January, for all SADF forces to be withdrawn from Angola. 156 Cuban troops with Soviet weaponry continued to pour in, bolstering Cuban/MPLA confidence and aggression. It was very obvious that, if the SADF intended to continue contesting Angola, they would require very significant and politically untenable reinforcements; indeed, already the SADF's deployed conscript service was extended for an extra month, while 5 000 citizen force members were mobilised to cover the withdrawal. After 8 January 1976, these reservists started relieving the national servicemen, who departed alongside thousands of fleeing Portuguese civilian refugees. On 3 February 1976, P.W. Botha told the Washington Post there were 3 000-4 000 South Africa troops in southern Angola, across the border at maximum fifty miles north of the Namibian border. 157 Meanwhile the Cubans/MPLA continued advancing slowly south, concerned with their now lengthening logistical lines and hampered by SADF mines and damaged bridges. But the Cuban military did not draw the South Africans into any further battles, despite Castro's bluster on 15 March from Conakry in Guinea, threatening to attack and even extend the war into Namibia. When President Neto gave assurances that the Cunene dams would not be interfered with, the SADF brought all its troops out of Angola by 27 March. The retreat brought mixed receptions in the Republic: the NP-supporting Afrikaans press spoke about intervention being a "ligte mistakie", 158 while a retired SAAF Brigadier J.G. Willers referred in a press letter to it being South Africa's "Bay of Pigs".
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SADF "lessons" from Savannah and Modernisation
The most important of these lessons concerned army equipment deficiencies, 160 specifically inadequate armour and artillery. But only a thorough archival examination will provide a detailed assessment of the degree to which the SADF acknowledged and responded to all issues, particularly sensitive matters such as how the operation was commanded, morale of troops and the care of wounded. 161 Jannie Geldenhuys who was in charge of the army's debriefing conferences, refers to substantial changes/adjustments occurring regarding battle techniques/procedures, equipment and closer cooperation between different army corps and the three services. 162 
Armour
Eland armoured cars crewed mostly by national servicemen formed the column spearheads, although these vehicles were originally intended only to support motorised infantry while operating on good roads. The operational reality demanded far more, but being an armoured car and not a tank, the Eland combat capability was restricted when driving upon terrain more suited for tracked vehicles. 163 Its limitations on very rough roads was noted when Foxbat on 30 October 1975 proceeded with 13 Elands up the exceptionally difficult Benguela route to Babaera. Upon their arrival, only seven cars were still in proper working condition. However, despite its limitations, the Eland 90s lifted the confidence and morale of the infantry. 164 Other criticisms of the Eland included its limited capacity to store ammunition -just 20 rounds 90 mm, while armour logistical support was often found wanting. The lowness of the vehicle made sighting difficult over the thick Angolan bush, which differed from terrain on which crews had trained in Republic bases or at Walvis Bay. 165 But at the height of the central front fighting, the Cuban/MPLA forces had no armoured vehicle matching the Eland, let alone the numbers available to SADF commanders, most particularly when the SADF advanced over the repaired Bridge 14, using their Elands devastatingly against the retreating Cuban/MPLA troops. Soviet-designed BDRM scout cars, being thinly armoured with just a heavy machine gun bore no comparison, while MPLA/Cuban forces had limited numbers of PT-76 amphibious light tanks, but these were also too lightly protected. Armoured cars were not part of Soviet conventional warfare doctrine, as imitated by the Cubans.
The Elands provided the SADF with mobility and fire power that could be used aggressively. But although resistant to small arms and shell shrapnel, Elands were vulnerable to Soviet RPG-7s and recoilless guns, while anti-tank defence was a Cubans specialty. Elands rarely encountered tanks during Savannah. One exception occurred on 18 December, when Battle-group Orange deployed some 50 km north east of Foxbat, engaged T-34 tanks across the blown bridge over the Pombuigi River. Eland 90-mm fire disabled one tank and caused the other to retreat. 166 However, also on this critical front, five Elands were rendered unserviceable through mechanical failure. 167 Any future infantry fighting vehicle needed to be capable of operating for extended periods independently of logistical backup. The Eland's limitations and the infantry's mechanisation requirements stressed the urgent need to accelerate Ratel infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) developments, already existent from 1974. Ultimately, the SADF were provided with a versatile six-wheeled vehicle that could also deliver 90-mm fire power and deploy troops, with several variations thereof regarding main armament. 168 The initial post-Savannah requirement was 504. 169 
Artillery
During Savannah, SADF artillery was hindered by a "strategic ability deficit", namely the prompt shifting of guns and related equipment from bases/storage in the Republic to the Angolan battle zones. Secondly, tactical mobility (physical man-handling around) of guns was hindered by the Angolan rainy season with compounding difficult bush and muddy terrain. The Cuban/FAPLA artillery, Soviet 130-mm and 122-mm guns, and not least 122-mm BDM-21 launchers, held a very clear range advantage and therefore, SADF artillery ingenuity had to compensate. Van der Westhuizen explained that it was during the Bridge 14 artillery duels that the SA Artillery departed from much of its Royal Artillery-inherited culture. SADF artillery learnt to fight "independently and aggressively" and not only in a predictable pattern as fire support for infantry and armour. Guns were at times deployed well forward, fired, and then moved back before Cubans/FAPLA could retaliate -"guerrilla tactics with a gun". The 140-mm shells' comparative limited explosive power was another prompt to push guns ahead, ensuring each shot counted. 170 However, forward deployment of artillery often placed crews close to the direct fire zones, 171 but the intense, saturating fire supporting the Bridge 14 attack, ensured sustained advance by Foxbat's armoured cars and infantry. SADF artillery also lacked a high angle capability, meaning that the higher the angle elevation a gun fires from, the more it can be concealed and protected behind high ground. 172 But what the artillery did achieve during Savannah ensured their upgrading needs received priority attention thereafter.
outranged we weren't outgunned. The Soviet employment of artillery was very rigid and command and control was centralised -no room for lateral thinking or innovation. We were the opposite. 174 To fight effectively, gunners must possess all their requisite equipment in the combat zone. Future planning is needed to accommodate a scenario whereby guns might again be urgently required to deploy. The artillery reinforcements brought to the central front from 25 November, travelled 2 500 km by rail and road from Potchefstroom. One immediate solution was the placing at Grootfontein of a full 140-mm battery, along with reserves, while the post-Savannah gunners' debriefing stressed the need to acquire new longer-range guns.
175 Three essential features for future artillery were that 155 mm was the correct calibre, not only powerful as an explosive conventional warfare round, but also appropriate for nuclear, biological or chemical weapon use. The Cuban/MPLA forces during any possible future conflict would again use Soviet artillery doctrine, which utilised massed bombardment. Therefore, the side with the best advantage would be that with artillery equipment capable of superior tactical mobility.
Because of the hostile international climate towards South Africa, the new artillery had to come from the local arms manufacturers. 176 The new G5 towed 155-mm guns with a 40-km range, began from a programme started in 1978, while Armscor also developed a long-range base bleed round for the 140-mm gun, extending its range to 21 km. 177 Another artillery development was the SADF's 127-mm self-propelled multiple rocket launcher named Valkari, copied from an intact captured Soviet-BDM-21. During the late 1980s, the G6 155-mm self-propelled gun would ultimately prove itself without comparison to any Soviet artillery deployed in Angola.
Engineering
By 1975, the SA Engineering Corps bridging equipment included the best of British Army material, obtained through circumventing the arms embargo. 178 But this equipment saw no Savannah service and improvisation with local materials like logs, only partially resolved problems with blown bridges. From the operation's outset, Comdt. Shylock Mulder, commander of 2 Field Engineering Regiment, was informed by Brig. Schoeman that he was to be the operation's engineering advisor and logistics officer. Mulder completed appreciations and discussed bridge building equipment needs with Van Deventer; but just before the Bridge 14 battle, Mulder was told combat bridging equipment would not be made available. Such was in accordance with political instructions that any loss of such equipment would be embarrassing and compromise future clandestine purchases. 179 Local materials could not suffice for bridging the Pombuigi River during Battle Group Orange's attempted advance on Quibala, a situation confirmed by Mulder when he made a personal inspection of this site. 180 Mulder believed that at least components of available combat bridging could have been flown into Angola and trucked to the required sites and that in the event of retreat, such could have been destroyed or withdrawn by the SADF.
181
Infantry/SADF Conscripts
Training inadequacies amongst FNLA and Unita troops often rendered them unsuitable for advancing upon specific objectives under fire. Field commanders therefore appealed for more SADF infantry reinforcements and increasingly white infantry conscripts were deployed to the central front, particularly around Bridge 14, besides Battle-groups Orange and X-Ray. Novo Redondo was from late December reinforced with 5 SAI troops. 182 A critical lesson for the infantry corps, proved not least by the high Unita/FNLA casualties at Ebo, was that for future offensive operations, infantry needed mobility and protection. This had to be associated with a combined arms mechanised battle-group. For this, the "soft-skin" transport of Unimogs and Bedfords were not robust enough, let alone adequate for transporting soldiers directly into frontline battlefield conditions. An effective infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) was urgently required.
There is also no doubt that during Savannah, half-trained Unita and Fapla infantry were used effectively as cannon fodder and took the heaviest "SADF" casualties, politically completely unacceptable had they been white troops. 183 When trained infantry were necessary for frontal assaults on strengthened positions and casualties were likely, white troops could not be made available. Such was the situation for Battle-group Orange on 18 December, when Comdt. Dolf Carstens required a koppie occupied on the northern side of the Pombuigi River, so that bridge repair could be undertaken to continue the advance on Quibala. More than a company of trained infantry was available, but their use could not realistically be considered. 184 An archival study and interviews focused on national servicemen's experiences might also assist in revealing more of conscripts' experiences, which as internet sites demonstrate, unsurprisingly diverge in detail emphasis, compared to regular soldiers who have been written about or interviewed regarding Savannah. Conscript sacrifices were not always appreciated: some national servicemen gunners -who had been in Angola since November 1975 -returning to Grootfontein between 24 January and 6 February 1976, were ordered to a far part of the base without any facilities and not allowed into the main base area, until they had shaved and cleaned. This insensitive pettiness reflects a lack of insight by some base officers at the ordeal the conscripts had been through. 185 As virtually none of the SADF Savannah participants had any prior war experience, the casualties from some engagements must have been experienced by conscripts as particularly severe. On 11 November, an 11 Commando mortar team suffered eighteen national servicemen casualties from one enemy bomb; one of whom died later. 186 Amongst the numerous fights at the different fronts, conscripts were killed or injured in action or died through accidents, 187 while six were taken prisoner. Of the total 35
SADF Savannah fatalities about half were conscripts: 188 Armour (7); Infantry (5), Artillery (3) Engineers (2). Clarity is still needed upon final numbers of SADF wounded; a figure of about 100 has been suggested, 189 but not verified. The majority of wounded casualties would certainly have been national servicemen, although details still need to be located as to the extent of their injuries. Morale did depreciate at times amongst some white troops, indicated by occasions where they attempted to avoid combat. Breytenbach mentions two incidents: a paratrooper who temporarily deserted his comrades after the fighting around Catengue 190 and a soldier from another unit who absconded in the wake of the Ebo disaster and attempted to reach SWA/Namibia.
191
Within an artillery component supporting Battle-group Orange, Lt. Johan Potgieter encountered a battery where the gunners' organisation and morale appeared to have all but collapsed. 192 There seems little doubt the Ebo disaster impacted negatively upon the national servicemen particularly. 193 An urgent request was sent directly afterwards for each of an Afrikaans-and an English-speaking chaplain to be despatched to the front. 194 Thereafter chaplains tended to be positioned at medical posts and approximately seventeen were eventually deployed during Savannah. 195 Initially, there were only two doctors with the SADF in Angola and by 10 November, a senior physician was placed at Rundu, before casualties were passed onto 1 Military Hospital. When hostilities increased during late November, enhanced medical services were obviously required closer the battlefield. An existing hospital at Cela, seventy kilometres behind the front, was commandeered and medical personnel were dispatched including 6 medical officers and 9 ordinances. These were joined shortly afterwards by another 6 medical officers and 13 other medical personnel. These arrived just in time for the Ebo injured. When the first casualties arrived -14 wounded South Africans and 22 Unita -the hastily assembled team was still not entirely ready. There was a shortage of blood plasma and initially no evacuation helicopter, with casualties being driven to Cela hospital on bad roads for five and a half hours after being wounded. Only from the following day was a helicopter made available.
Other patients later admitted to Cela hospital included 14 cases of "war exhaustion" and 11 cases of "shellshock"; there is no verification whether these were SADF or UNITA or both. 196 From 12 to 15 December, a psychiatrist visited Cela and two categories of shellshock were identified: patients with hysteria, incapable of standing or giving their names, and a second group displaying symptoms of aggression and negativity, determined not to return to the front. The first group was treated with psychotherapy and rest; the second group was isolated because of their "aggressive and negative influence". 197 It is a contested point whether, according to the Defence Act, the government had the legal right to deploy conscripts in Angola. Viljoen felt the government needed no such permission from national servicemen.
Lt. Johan Potgieter ordered troops to bury enemy bodies and body parts after the advance over Bridge 14 and explained how tough this was. Gen. Van der Westhuizen describes how, despite the troops' youth and limited training, they were well disciplined and performed well. 199 Breytenbach's account of the paratrooper, who out of fear deserted his comrades, is one of the few recorded examples of a South African troop cracking under strain. 200 Breytenbach was also critical of SSB members for allegedly leaving Unita troops in the lurch during one skirmish in the Bridge 14 vicinity. 201 Internet sites where individual veterans post recollections, suggest many conscripts unsurprisingly experienced confusion and fear at being lurched into a war around issues that none could have comprehended properly.
202
Conclusion
The SADF had undergone numerous changes since 1945, but its conventional war planning and much of its obsolete equipment were, by 1975, inadequate for the kind of operation that Savannah evolved into. The SADF was hampered by a lack of precise war aims, despite Defence Minister Botha enjoying the military's full confidence, 203 while he and
Vorster made a gross miscalculation in assuming American support would be sustained for an SADF intervention. 204 SADF field commanders, caught up with the war's momentum, kept pushing forces forward, as at Ebo, in an attempt to accelerate the campaign according to their perceptions of the operational realities. By mid-December, the SADF advance had ground to a halt, consequential to their political instructions, equipment/manpower limitations and Cuban/MPLA resistance. The political objective of securing an anti-MPLA political victory was lost and the SADF could not confront swelling Cuban forces without their own massive reinforcements. Such would inevitably have sustained high numbers of white casualties, impossible to justify in terms of NP political priorities. And still, of course, there was no guarantee of a military victory. There was even less chance of achieving a sustainable political success through enforcing a Unita/FNLA government in Luanda via SADF coercion.
There is some truth to the Cuban claim that Ebo was a decisive battle, but from a South African perspective, Savannah's operational details remained closely guarded for years thereafter. Only in 1989 did a censored version of Spies's original manuscript appear in book form. 205 Known exclusions included the evacuation of army personnel by the SAN after Roberto's aborted attempt to seize Luanda. Also omitted was the incident of a SAAF helicopter shot down in error on 4 January 1976 by SADF antiaircraft gunners, resulting in the death of Brig. J.D. Potgieter and four other SADF members. 206 Savannah transformed into a brief but fierce conventional war, where for both sides, skilled artillery usage was fundamental to attaining or denying the enemy objectives.
The SADF demonstrated marked resourcefulness and innovation in utilising the equipment and personnel at their disposal, for example, the often-successful deployment of Elands in a tank role, the determined far forward locating of artillery, and also the extraordinary initial advances by Task Force Zulu. There is no doubt that Bridge 14 was a well-fought SADF victory, demonstrating high professional soldier qualities amongst South African field commanders and courage from their conscript troops. These SADF successes, pro-Cuban/MPLA writers prefer to ignore or play down, carping instead about Ebo and the SADF withdrawal. Artillery was undoubtedly responsible for most casualties and in determining the outcome at the larger engagements: Novo Rondo, Ebo, Bridge 14 and the SADF's failure to advance beyond Quibala. Whether the SADF at this point in its history could have performed better by using more of its capacity is a matter of conjecture, but Breytenbach for one, believes it could have. 207 The Cubans proved themselves particularly skilled at building and holding defensive positions, but less so in mobile fighting within African bush terrain. 208 However, their numbers and access to the best of Soviet hardware made them a potentially formidable foe against which the SADF urgently needed to modernise. Savannah had also demonstrated how quickly an enemy conventional force within Angola could be deployed into action, a warning to ensure the SADF markedly improved their conventional force mobilisation and combat capabilities. From 1976, the Ratel IFV appeared and artillery developments continued to produce the G5 and G6 guns, while 1977 witnessed the extension of national service to two years, to train and maintain combat troops over a longer period, in terms of assuring their battle proficiency and keeping adequate deployable troops under arms. From 1978, a permanent battle group, 61 Mechanised Battalion, was located in northern Namibia to face any future conventional threat.
For all its political blunders, Savannah provided the SADF with a vital learning curve. In mid-1978, Operation Kwiksilwer took place -a full conventional war exercise intended to assess the army conventional war capacity, which coincided with the highly successful Ascension Day strikes against SWAPO bases in Angola, themselves conventional in operation. 
